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an appeal is
on the clerk's
and certain exhibits, and
error is claimed to appear on
face of the record, in the
absence of
to
the record it will be presumed that contains all matters material to a determination
of the
on Appeal, rule 52.)
[3a, 3b] Architects- Who May Practice Architecture.-17 Cal.
architectural plans and specificaAdmin.
§
additions, alterations or repair of
to be prepared by a licensed
'"''~w"'"'• is a valid administrative
to practice in another
plans, drawings and specificawithout first obtaining a license
& Prof. Code, §§ 5550, 5551),
or a
certificate. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5540.)
[4a, 4b] Id.-Certificates.-Where a contract for architectural services
that though defendant "is not an architect" he
could, because of his education, training and experience, prepare
and specifications for a hospital addition
he could not be rewas
measure of his
quired to obtain an architect's license or a temporary certificate.
[5]
Performance.-Where a conmode of performance, but
be assumed that the parties
IJn'b"u"''u

UWALv.cva

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d,
[5] See Cal.Jnr.2d, vv'-'"""'
:UicK. Dig. References:
Error, § 1105.1
6-10]

Contracts, § 153.
3; [2] Appeal and
Contracts, § 40.
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plaintiff's fl"""'''"'
!d.-Certificates.-Where a contract for architectural services
for a
not authorized to u"'"'5·'~""
to a third party under the
"assistance
of other individuals" the >w.on''"gti
and speci:fications
defendant
assistance of
a licensed architect, would
requirement of
sp<,cm,cm;wrts be
17 Cal. Admin. Code, §
prepared by a
licensed
[8] Id.-Certi.ficates.-The purpose of Health & Saf. Code, § 1411,
authorizing the State Department of Public Health to make
reasonable rules and
with
to hospitals, was
to enable the
for the
safety and
the requirebuildings
ment of 17 Cal.
be designed by
by the
certification of
State
Architectural Examiners
is reasonably related to
of that purpose.
[9] Id.-Certi:licates.-17 Cal. Admin. Code, § 406, requiring architectural plans and
for a hospital addition to be
prepared by a licensed architect or
civil
does not conflict with Bus. & Prof.
§ 5537, excepting
from the general
of the code those persons
who, on written disclosure
the fact that they are unlicensed,
seek to provide architectural
since § 5537 does not
confer on ali persons for all purposes the right to design
buildings.
[10] !d.-Certificates.-Where a contract for architectural services
in connection with
plans and
for a
hospital addition
in violation of 17
Cal. Admin.
that such plans and specifications be prepared by
architect or registered civil
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APPEAL from a
Angeles County. Donald E.
versed.
Action for
architectural services.

Court of Los
pro tern.• Re-

for breach of a contract to render
for
reversed.

Louis M. Welsh and David H.
Morrow & Morrow and John C. Morrow for Respondent.
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal on the
roll from
a judgment for the plaintiff in an action to recover damages
for the breach of a contract to render architectural services
in connection with the construction of an addition to a
hospital.
The defendant is an architect licensed to practice in the
State of Nebraska. He is not licensed in the State of California, nor does he hold a temporary certificate to act as an
architect in this state. In April 1954 the plaintiff and the
defendant signed a contract dated January 2, 1954. The
contract provides in part as follows:
". . . Chalmers is not an architect [licensed to practice
in California] . . . Chalmers, because of his education, training and experience, can prepare for Owner plans, drawings
and specifications for said hospital addition and is willing
to assist Owner in the construction and finishing of said
building and . . . Owner desires to employ Chalmers for the
period of time necessary to complete such work . . . the
parties hereto agree as follows :
"1. That Chalmers shall be employed by Owner and shall:
"A. Prepare for Owner plaus, drawings and specifications
for said building including preliminary plans, final and working drawings and specifications
with the requirements and regulations of the California State Department of
Public Health, the California State Fire Marshal, the United
States Department of Public Health and United States Civil
Defense Administration including such large seale and full
sized detailed drawings for architectural, structural, plumb*Assigned by Chairman of J udieia.l Council

other mechanical work and engineering
as are necessary for purposes of construction.
"B. Obtain the
of said final and working drawand
of any of the aforesaid
whenbe
to obtain financing of the
''C. Assist
the services of a general contractor.
"D.
construction..••
"E.
bills for costs of construction ...•
'' 2. That Owner shall pay to Chalmers as salary the sum
Dollars . . . a month for each month
of Seven Hundred
1954. . . .
from February
"4. That
for the erection of said building
shall be completed on or before May 1, 1954, and final working
drawings and specifications shall be completed and twelve
. . . copies of the same submitted to Owner on or before
September 1, 1954.
"5. That Chalmers may obtain the assistance of other individuals to assist him in his work hereunder but they shall
not be employees of Owner and Owner shall be under no
obligation to compensate such individuals or to reimburse
Chalmers for such expenses as may be incurred by him in
connection therewith. . . .
"9. That this
shall constitute the entire contract with
to this matter."
The defendant began work in February 1954. He prepared
some
which were found by the trial
court to be incomplete, not in accordance with the agreement,
and of no value to the
The defendant did not comdrawings, plans, or specificaplete any of the final or
tions as required by the contract.
In October 1954 the defendant repudiated the contract on
the ground that
by him was illegal because he
architecture in California.
was not licensed to
The trial court found
the defendant, denied him
and rendered judgment for the
relief on his
plaintiff for $13,075 of which $6,375 was for salary theretofore paid by the
to the defendant and $6,700 of
which was for the difference between the salary to which
Chalmers was entitled under the contract and the fee paid
to the architect who undertook to design and construct the
building
repudiation.

for new conof any buildings to
as defined in 'l'itle 17,
shall be submitted to
Health for review and apof construction. . . .
shall be prepared by a duly
licensed architect or
civil
'' (c) Plans shall be submitted in two

conclusion of law: "Said
written agreement was not
or unlawful in any particular, either at the time it was executed or thereafter, nor
was the
thereof
either party thereto illegal,
Said written
was not void
thereto."
contention that the findings of fact
of the contract and
recite the above
Administrative Code
do not
that conclusion.
[2] It should be noted that the
is presented on the
clerk's
and certain exhibitR. The error is claimed
in the absence of
to appear on the face of the record.
it will be presumed that
to
the
it contains all matters material to a determination of the
Rules on
; see also 3 Witon
kin. California
2239-2243.)
If section 406 is a valid administrative regulation, it
is clear that Chalmers could not have rendered a lawful
a Hcense (Bus. & Prof.
without first
5551),
certificate
& Prof.
contends that an obligation to obtain a license was
upon the defendant by
the contract. The contract contains two recitals relevant to

Feb.
the determination
"is not an architect."
mers, because of his "'"'u."'"'Hvu,
prepare for Owner
addition. . .

no
If the contract is the sole
practice architecture in this
it is clear that he
measure of the defendant's
cannot be
to obtain an
license or a temporary certificate. It is
that because the
defendant could have
first
obtaining a temporary certificate or a license to practice
architecture, he was not
from
a lawful
It is a familiar rule that
performance by section 406.
where a contract does not
mode of
performance, but may be
it will be
contracted for a lawful performance.
assumed that the
(Burne v. Lee, 156 Cal. 221 [104 P.
v. Brown,
63 Cal.App.2d 504
P.2d
.)
The present
contract is not, however, of that nature. lt recites that it
contains the vvhole

performance
would impose upon the
which he did
not assume under the contraet.
it heen intended that
the defendant should obtain
it would have been no
The finding that
task to have so
before entering into the
the defendant orally informed the plaintiff that he intended to obtain a license does
not affect that conclusion. The
to be a
complete integration and the
of fact are silent as to
what effect, if any, such a statement could have had upon the
that the contract was
present contract.
the
drawn by the plaintiff's
tends to support the construction which is now
upon it. (See Thomas v. Hunt
MffJ. Corp., 42 Cal.2d
739 [269 P.2d 12).)
[7] The plaintiff urges that beeause the contract authorized the defendant to ". . . obtain the assistance of other
individuals to assist him in his work. . . . " Chalmers could
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preparation of
Chalmers personally, but with the assistance a licensed
would have
and specificamet the
of section 406 that
tions be prepared by a ''
licensed architect.
The plaintiff contends that section 406 is not a valid regulation, that it is
not related to any statutory
purpose, and that it conflicts with section 5537 of the Business and Professions Code.
[3b, 8] Section 1411 of the Health and Safety Code provides: '' 'rhe State department . . . shall make . . . reasonable rules and regulations to carry ont the purpose of this
chapter, classifying hospitals and preseribing minimum
standards of safety and sanitation in the physical plant, of
diagnostic, therapeutic and laboratory facilities and equipment . . . of hospitals." The purpose of that section was to
enable the Department of Public Health to make rules providing for the safety and sanitation of hospital buildings. It
is clear that the requirement of section 406 that hospital
buildings be designed by persons of proved ability as evidenced by the certification of the State Board of Architectural Examiners is reasonably related to accomplishment of
that purpose.
[9] Nor is the contention that the regulation conflicts with
section 5537 of the Business and Professions Code meritorious.
That section provides: ''This chapter doPs not prevent any
person from making any
or
for his own buildings or from furnishing to other persons, plans, drawings,
specifications, instruments of service, or other data for buildings, if, prior to accepting employment or commencing work
on such plans, drawings, specifications, instruments of service,
or other data, the person, so furnishing such plans, drawings,
specifications, instruments of service, or data, fully informs
such other person or persons, in writing, that he . . . is not
an architect." The obvious purpose of that section is to except
from the general licensing provisions of the code those persons who, upon written disclosure of the fact that they are
unlicensed, seek to provide architectural services. It does not
confer upon all persons for all purposes the right to design
buildings in this state.

Feb.

"'m·<>nrn>H'~" INC. 'II.
13]
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Section 1417 of the Health and Safety Code provides: ''Any
person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter or
of the rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter
is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall
be punished
a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars . . .
or by
in the county
for a
not to
exceed 180
or
both such fine and
''
[10] As
section 406 the Administrative Code was
adopted pursuant to section 1411 of that chapter. In view
of the fact that the contract required a performance in violation of section 406 such conduct would have been punishable
under section 1417. Recovery under the facts of this case
would give effect to an unlawful
The defendant was
therefore justified in refusing to proceed further under the
contract.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority that the contract involved
here is illegal on the ground that it violates section 406, title
17, of the California Administrative Code, inasmuch as the
provisions of section 5537 of the Business and Professions
Code expressly permit a contract between an unlicensed architect and client upon the former's disclosure that he is
unlicensed.
We are dealing here with a code section (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 5537) enacted by the Legislature and a regulation adopted
by an administrative agency pursuant to enabling legislation.
The fact that this regulation appears within the California
Administrative Code does not raise the regulation to the
comparable status of a code section passed by the Legislature
since the "Administrative Code" is not a code as such but
only the conglomeration of all the rules and regulations
adopted by state agencies and filed with the secretary of state
(Gov. Code, § 11370 et seq.). Where on one hand there is a
law passed by the Legislature under its general police power,
and on the other hand a regulation adopted by a state agency,
laws enacted by the T.1egislature will prevail over regulations
made by the administrative agency with regard to matters
which are not exclusively that agency's affairs (see Tolman v.
Underhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712 [249 P.2d 280]; Wilson v.
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C.2d

Beville, 47 Cal.2d
caise v. California Emp.
56 Cal.App.2d
554 [133
P.2d 47]; Hamblin v. State Per·sonnel Board, 148 Cal.App.2d
53, 55 [306 P.2d 118] ; cf., Hirschman v. County of Los
Angeles, 39 Cal.2d
703
P.2d 287, 250 P.2d 145]).
To determine whether or not the
has undertaken
field of
on
to occupy
a
an analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts
and circumstances on which it was intended to operate (see
Tolman v.
S1tpra, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712). Moreover
where the
has enacted statutes governing a particular subject matter, its intent to oceupy the field preempting other regulations is not to be measured by the language
alone but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative
seheme (see Tolnwn v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712).
It is clear that the Legislature of California has attempted
to regulate the practice of architecture in this state. It has
seen fit to require an architect desiring to practice here to
obtain a license and his failure to do so is a misdemeanor
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5586). However, it has also written
an exemption into this licensing requirement in section 5537,
by which an architect may practice even though unlicensed,
if he makes a written disclosure to his client of the fact he
is unlicensed. The determinative question before us is whether
this exemption is intended by the Legislature to occupy
exclusively the matters of architectural licensing. The majority answers this question by stating that "It [Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 5537] docs not confer upon all persons for all purposes
the right to design buildings in this state.'' This answer would
appear to beg the question, but in addition it is inadequate
for the reason that there is no attempt to explore the situations
and conditions upon which section 5537 is intended to operate, as is required by the principles heretofore stated.
Section 5537 of the Business and Professions Code permits
an unlicensed person to perform services constituting the
practice of architecture if he gives written notice that he is
not an architect. The policy underlying this section has been
stated to be the prevention of unlicensed persons from preparing plans and specifications unless the client knows and is
informed that such person is unlicensed. (W. M. Ballard
Corp. v. Dougherty, 106 CaJ.App.2d 35, 41 [234 P.2d 745].)
In more concrete terms the statutory notice is provided for the
benefit of the owner merely to place him on his guard as to
whether or not he wishes to employ an uncertified person
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224, 226 [288 P.
11

).

It is clear from the cases that the exemption provisions of
s;eetion 5f537 are intended to operate for the benefit of all

owners. There is no
to restrict the exemption to
owners and exclude others; the statute
its terms
all
However this statement of
policy is too uncertain
auc! not conclusive on
of intent to occupy the
further analysis is necesfield of architecture """"'""·"'
sary.
The key to the ascertainment of the legislative intent is
found in the reason for creating such an exemption. The
most obvious reason, and the one I believe makes sense, is to
enable the citizens of California to have access to architects
licensed in other states but who are unlicensed in this state.
This exemption, when so interpreted, recognizes the individualistic disposition of an architect and the attempts architects make to preserve the integrity of their individual expression. In other words if a citizen of California admires the
work of a New York architect and wishes to employ him he
may do so, and the architect in turn would be able to work
unfettered by any associatio11 with California architects, preserving the individuality of his work. It is clear that without
snch exemption a California citizen could only employ a nonresident unlicensed architect where the latter would be required to work with a certified California architect, and
this could well be an unacceptable condition to an architect
who plaees the individual nature of his work in a paramount
position. The exemption appears to be realistic in that the
Legislature recognized the desirability of permitting architects from other states, and indeed other countries, to practice in California in a manner by which they can express
their individual ideas unimpeded by others. Therefore, in its
broader aspects the exemption is an attempt by the Legislature
to eliminate provincialism in architecture.
To be successful this attempt must be exclusive and not
subject to exceptions. If the Department of Public Health
is permitted to deal with the licensing of architects, then
logically other administrative agencies may likewise carve
out exceptions subject only to constitutional limitations. But
if this were permitted the reason for allowing unlicensed
architects to practice in California would be defeated. Thus,
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in order to effectuate the reasons behind section
its application must be deemed
and any regulation that
this application must
Tolrnan v. Underhill, supra, 39 CaL2d 708.)
'l'his conclusion does not undermine the Department of
Public Health in their
over
since all plans
for
must be submitted to them and disapproved if
are defective
CaL Admin. Code 406). Moreover, the
department may
even though the architect
submitting them is licensed in California. So, in fact, whether
or not a person is licensed is immaterial to the approval or
disapproval. It is further evident that there is no more assurance that an architect licensed by the State of California will
be any more able to submit
plans for a hospital than
a licensed architect from any other Ntate. Any assumption
the provincialism that
to the contrary appears to
section 5537 was designed to avoid.
For the reasons above stated it would appear that the contract here involved is valid under section 5537 of the Business
and Professions Code, and plaintiff is therefore entitled to
recover damages for its breach.
I would therefore affirm the judgment.

[S. F. No.19329. In Bank. Feb. 25, 1958.J

SIGNAL OIL AND GAS COMPANY (a Corporation) et al.,
Respondents, v. ASHLAND OIL AND REFINING
COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Appellants.
[1] Corporations-Stockholders' Meetings-Voting Agreements.The validity of an agents' agreement entered into by some
stockholders of a corporation incorporated in ~mother state is
governed by the law of that state, and a decision of its highest
court that such agreement is void as an illegal voting trust is,
on principles of full faith and credit (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1),
binding on the Supreme Court of California.
[lJ Validity of voting trust or other similar agreement for
control of voting power of corporate stock, note, 105 A.L.R. 123.
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 246; Am.Jur., Corporations,
§ 500 et seq.
M:cK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Corporations,§ 392; [3] Injunctions, § 93; [5, 7, 10] Injunctions, § 48; [6, 8) Judgments, § 347;
[9] Courts, § 10; [11] Corporations, § 716; [121 14] Injunctions,
§ 74(2); [13, 15-18] Corporations, § 566.

